Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 53 by Victor Caston;

Author:Victor Caston; [Caston, Victor]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780192547613
Publisher: OUP Premium
Published: 2017-11-17T00:00:00+00:00

(a) Aidōs without virtue of character

The core objection to the second argument of NE 4. 9, as we saw, is that it focuses only on retrospective shame for things one has already done, and so neglects the sense of aidōs as an inhibitory disposition. But in fact, Aristotle begins the passage with a reference to inhibitory aidōs. The young, he says, are praised for being aidēmōn ‘because they live by their feelings and so make many errors, but are held back by aidōs’ (διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἁμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι, 1128b17–18). Aristotle is clearly talking about prospective shame: aidōs is praised in the young because it pevents them from acting on their wayward desires.69 Elsewhere he says that the young are inclined to obey their bodily appetites, pursuing whatever strikes them as pleasant and avoiding pains.70 Aidōs (in the occurrent sense) is also a feeling, according to Aristotle, but one that generally inhibits the pursuit of base pleasures.71 If young people are aidēmōn, or disposed to feel aidōs in the appropriate way, their fear of disrepute (especially in the eyes of parents and other authority figures) will tend to overrule their inclinations and keep them on the right path.72 Aristotle goes on to say that no one would praise an older person for being ‘prone to shame’ (aischuntēlos), ‘since we think that he shouldn’t do anything that calls for shame [ἐφ᾿ οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη (1128b20–1).73 While it is true that here he shifts from aidōs to aischunē, and in the rest of the passage seems to focus on shame felt at things one has already done, the context implies that adults should not be disposed to feel prospective shame either.74 Aidōs is praised in the young only because they are naturally inclined to do shameful things, and their fear of disrepute holds them back. A mature adult, however, should not have such base inclinations in the first place, and so should not need aidōs to keep him on track.

The key point, on this reading, is that Aristotle thinks that aidōs, understood as the fear of disrepute, can be an effective motive for someone who, in some sense, wants to act shamefully. But virtue of character disposes a person to desire to do the fine thing because it is fine. Thus, when Aristotle says that ‘shame [αἰσχύνη] is not characteristic of a decent person’ (1128b21–2), we should take his claim to cover both prospective and retrospective shame.75 Indeed, the passage as a whole suggests that he regards both kinds of shame as aspects of a single disposition.76 In each case, according to Aristotle, what causes someone to refrain from acting shamefully or, having already erred, to blush or hide oneself away is the fear of disrepute. On the above interpretation, it is no surprise that Aristotle mentions self‐control (ἐγκράτεια) at the close of the chapter, remarking that it is not a virtue either but ‘a sort of mixed state’ (1128b33–4). In NE 7. 1 we are told

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